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Abstract 
The present work project aims at evaluating the impact of contract-program 
implementation in 2003 and of incentives created in 2007 on hospital output, under the 
DRG inpatient classification system. A sample of five Portuguese acute public district 
hospitals was chosen as sample, between 2002 and 2007. Results of hypothesis testing 
shows positive significant effects on decreasing average lengths of stay, despite 
significant average age and case-mix increases verified after 2002. Increasing rates of 
elective outpatient surgeries were also proved significant. Effects of the introduction of 
25 new medical outpatient DRG prices in 2007 were proven significant, even if a clear 
trend was not observable in terms of increases on outpatient discharges, exception made 
for DRG 410 (chemotherapy). Regression analysis, aiming at detecting upcoding effects 
in 109 DRG pairs, showed sensitiveness of fraction of the most complicated DRG on 
each pair to positive changes in DRG prices, for 3 out of 5 hospitals. However, average 
negative price changes verified for the considered timeframe cancelled expected 
upcoding effects. 
 
Keywords: Contract-program; DRG Classification System; Outpatient Incentives; 
Upcoding. 
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1. Introduction 
The present work project aims at evaluating the impact of contract-program 
implementation in 2003 and introduction of incentives in 2007 for outpatient discharges 
on the way hospitals classify their output, under the DRG
1
 classification system. 
A non-representative sample of five Portuguese public district hospitals was selected, 
by suggestion of ACSS,
2
 given their bed capacity, variety of location and wide array of 
acute healthcare services provided.  
Hypothesis testing was performed to several key indicator variables - such as lengths of 
stay, age, case-mix
3
, ratio of elective outpatient surgeries, types of admission, discharge 
and transfer and MDG
4
 output concentration - in order to identify relevant effects of 
policy changes on output efficiency and productivity. Regression analysis of upcoding 
aimed at detecting effects of changes in DRG prices and age on complexity of 109 DRG 
pairs, from 2003 to 2007. Tests of hypothesis were also performed to detect significant 
changes in DRG coding of 25 new medical outpatient DRGs. 
Results point out to significant reductions in average lengths of stay despite increases on 
average age and average case-mix complexity, as well as increases in shares of 
outpatient elective surgeries. Three out of five hospitals were found to significantly 
respond to changes in DRG prices by coding up patients to diagnosis which had 
suffered higher price increases. However, due to negative average price changes 
verified for this period, upcoding had not induced actual changes in DRG pairs’ 
complexity. Evidence of effects of new medical outpatient incentives was found in 14 
out of 25 DRGs, namely a strong increase in DRG 410 (chemotherapy). 
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Hence, the present work project aims at monitoring if policies undertaken to increase 
output efficiency and classification are in fact achieving its purposes, namely in terms of 
cost reduction and productivity enhancement, while maintaining quality standards in 
healthcare provision. 
A brief literature review will support theoretical background concerning issues such as 
the healthcare contracting process, the DRG classification system and DRG upcoding 
incentives. The methodological section describes data, sample and statistical methods 
adopted to answer to the stated research questions. Results, discussion, as well as 
relevant conclusions will comprise the remainder of the work project.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. The Healthcare Contracting Process 
Portuguese national health service’s current benchmarking of corporate management 
practices, such as the use of contract-programs, is an example of efforts taken in place at 
improving its financial efficiency and inverting the increasing trend in total health 
expenditure verified in Portugal (5,9% in 1990 to 9,9% in 2006)
5
, in the past sixteen 
years (Saltman and Mossaialos, 2002, quoted by OPSS, 2009; OECD, 2009).  
In generic terms, the healthcare contract model might be defined “as a system of direct 
payments, under contract, from the insurers or third parties to the providers for services 
rendered to insured patients, who receive benefits in kind” (OECD, 1992).  
The contract model concerns the negotiation of a prospective buying agreement 
established between three counterparts - users, insurers and providers - regarding 
healthcare services to be rendered. Contracts might be defined on the basis of quantity, 
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effectiveness, price and quality criteria, where monitoring
6
 and evaluation
7
 are also 
important dimensions to be considered for its proper implementation (Escoval, 2003).  
The contract-program concept plays an important role on changing the way health 
institutions are managed, resetting its focus from resource to results based management. 
As a financing tool, it allows for more equity on resource allocation, adjusting it to each 
hospital’s output. Separation of responsibilities between funders/insurers and providers 
has also given incentives for increased competition as well as helped developing quality 
and efficiency indicators. The introduction of efficiency weights on price calculation 
was decisive to establish contract-programs’ its necessary credibility and to 
qualitatively improve incentives provided to hospitals (OPSS, 2009). 
Nevertheless, several flaws might be pointed out to contract-programs, which are due 
specifically to lack of governmental focus on fixing and planning clear contracting 
objectives and lack of fit between contracted and produced outputs, allowing rewards 
for inefficiency. Information asymmetries caused by deficient monitoring capabilities 
and the weak penalties provided for managerial inefficiencies, decreasing incentives for 
rigorous accountability, are also relevant factors with potential to undermine contract-
programs’ main premises (Escoval, 2003). 
Types of contract-programs range from global contracts, in which the funder/insurer 
pays for a set of clearly defined services, without setting quantities or unitary prices, to 
contracts  which optimize health outcomes and value creation to healthcare users, hence 
the latter requiring more complex monitoring and evaluation systems, higher risk 
partition and soft, long term relationships, among counterparts (Escoval, 2003; OPSS, 
2009).  
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According to OPSS (2009), the contracting process in the Portuguese National Health 
Service has evolved into a cost/volume contract, based on payments by acts with pre-
determined volumes, set for each line of production
8
. Priority has been given to cost and 
volume reduction, despite quality and equity incentives recently introduced. However, 
notwithstanding efforts undertaken to improve the contracting process, improvements 
are still necessary to produce effective/expected health gains to its users. 
Due to its predominant prospective nature, the concept of contract-program implies that 
hospitals having to adjust their output classification to the terms included in the 
contract, if providers aim achieving contracted goals and avoid the premature depletion 
of its budget, prior to established deadlines.    
 
2.2. The DRG Classification System 
Contract-program output adjustment for prospective price calculations should be 
performed through the application of a classification system for acute inpatients capable 
of clearly defining a hospital’s products, thus allowing for equity in healthcare financing 
(Urbano and Bentes, 1994).  
All Payer Severity-adjusted DRGs is the current inpatient classification system in use by 
the Portuguese National Health Service’s acute hospitals. It contains 26 major diagnosis 
groups (MDG), grouped according to clinically coherence and resource consumption 
criteria, and divided on medical and surgical DRGs. Each one of the approximately 700 
DRGs is on its hand classified according to similarities in etiology, system or apparatus 
and on similarity of healthcare provision to all patients included on that particular DRG. 
DRGs are formed according to variables contained in hospitals’ discharge reports and 
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are mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups
9
. Several DRGs are grouped in pairs, 
taking into account differences in age and presence of complications or comorbidities, 
implying higher resource consumption (Urbano and Bentes, 1994). 
A hospital’s output price calculation under the contract-program methodology includes 
clarifying variables such as number of equivalent patients, adjusted case-mix index, 
number of inpatient days over pre-designated thresholds and its unitary base price 
(Bentes et al., 1996, quoted by Santana, 2005). 
Case-mix index reflects a hospital’s relativity in comparison to the hospitals’ national 
average, in terms of DRG complexity, thus being an essential variable for price 
definition under the contract-program work frame. The case-mix index is calculated by 
the following formula (Ordinance nr.839-A/2009, 31
st
 July): 
 
 
 
In which a weight is attributed to each DRG, reflecting its relative level of resource 
consumption in comparison to the average patient intensity of resource consumption - 
being weights calculated from variables contained in historical clinical records - and 
fixed at the national level, being also convertible to prices (Santana, 2005).  
The number of equivalent patients is another important adjustment variable for 
correcting price estimations, being defined as the total number of inpatient episodes 
obtained after converting short term inpatient days
10
 and transferred patients into 
equivalent sets of each DRG’s normal inpatient days (Ordinance nr.839-A/2009, 31
st
 
July).  
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Taking into account its relevance for price calculation, lengths of stay should be 
maintained within each DRG’s predetermined thresholds, minimizing marginal costs 
and thus maximizing its adjustment to contracted prices.  
Despite being a valid measure to contain costs and introduce incentives for efficiency 
and equity under a prospective payment scheme, the DRG classification system has also 
its drawbacks. It creates incentives for patient selection, potentially harmful for 
healthcare access and equity, mostly caused by problems related to DRGs’ weight 
structure. These problems arise from existing lags between calculated weights and real 
costs attributable to each DRG, either caused by political intervention, inefficient DRG 
weight determination methods
11
, or exogenous causes such as case severity, price 
compression or coding process issues
12
 (Santana, 2005). 
 
2.3. Upcoding Incentives 
Actually, one of the most relevant hazards to prospective healthcare financing under 
DRGs is connected with potential upcoding practices. Hospitals might engage in DRG 
upcoding, namely in DRG pairs (e.g. grouped by complications or age criteria) which 
otherwise would be set to the less expensive DRG in that pair, hence incurring in 
marginal gains. Dafny (2005) studied American hospitals’ responses to the age criteria 
abolition in 1988 and its impact on DRG coding practices, thus finding evidence of 
upcoding, namely in patients whose diagnosis had suffered the largest price increases 
after the reform, this effect being stronger among for-profit hospitals. Silverman and 
Skinner (2004) also found evidence of upcoding in American hospitals. Between 1989 
and 1996, the most expensive DRG in the pneumonia DRG pair had rose by 10 
percentage points among not-for-profit hospitals, 23 percentage points among for-profit 
                                                           
 
12
 E.g. upcoding. 
9 
 
hospitals and 37 percentage points in hospitals converting from non-profit to for-profit 
status. This study also concluded that more active upcoding practices from for-profit 
hospitals are rather a reflection of concerted efforts of administrators and physicians to 
share the risks of incurring in upcoding practices than of improved financial efficiency 
through reduced downcoding or case-mix increases.  
According to Dafny (2005), “the increase in the average case weight is the single 
largest source of increased hospital spending by Medicare”. DRG creep concerns the 
systematic upcoding of patients´ diagnosis in order to maximize hospital reimbursement 
(Grimaldi, 1985). It is consequence of possible aggressive upcoding strategies adopted 
by some hospitals trying to incur in marginal gains (e.g., by taking advantage of flaws 
on DRG coding monitoring), thus increasing discrepancies between actual costs 
incurred by the hospitals and contracted resources under a prospective payment system 
(Silverman and Skinner, 2004). 
Therefore, it is relevant to test the hypothesis of upcoding practices in Portuguese 
hospitals, namely in identifying possible significant effects of DRG price changes on 
case-mix complexity increases across time and hospitals, as well as the effect of other 
important variables, such as patients’ average age.    
 
2.4. Contract-program’s Incentives 
Recent incentives have been introduced under the contract-program scheme, aiming to 
improve output efficiency, such as the introduction of incentives to enhance outpatient 
outputs, e.g., by introducing new medical and surgical DRGs, as well as by increasing 
outpatient prices for some preexisting outpatient DRGs in 2007 (ordinance nr.110-
A/2007). SIGIC
13
 introduction in 2005 is another example of incentives undertaken to 
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increase output and quality within the system, being its adherence included as a clause 
in hospitals’ contract-programs. However, it is necessary to monitor into what extent 
these incentives have in fact produced positive or negative effects on output, (inducing a 
more efficient allocation of resources) in a period in which the Portuguese National 
Health Service aims at shifting a considerable amount of its outputs towards outpatient 
DRGs. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
Primary data sources comprised annual DRG database tables provided by ACSS’s 
“Unidade Operacional de Financiamento e Contratualização”
14
, belonging to five 
Portuguese acute district hospitals, between 2002 and 2007. Each table contained all 
clinical episodes coded for each hospital in the given time span, as well as several 
variables used for price setting purposes, such as length of stay, DRG codes, types of 
admission, discharge and transfer, number of equivalent patients and billing validity 
status. Data from ordinances nr.123/2003 and nr.110-A/2007 was also included in the 
tables, concerning types of DRGs, DRG weights and prices, as well as length of stay 
thresholds. Secondary data was gathered from “Centros de Saúde e Hospitais – 
Recursos e Produção do SNS” reports (2002-2007), concerning yearly variables such as 
average length of stay, occupancy rates and number of discharged patients, which were 
used to compare hospitals in the sample to the national aggregate. Stata
15
 and Microsoft 
Office Excel
16
 were the data analyses software used in the present work project. 
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3.2. Problem Definition 
Main objectives: 
• To identify upcoding trends in DRG coding practices between 2003 and 2007; 
• Identify changes in DRG coding variables from 2002 to 2007, related to 
contract-program implementation in 2003 and outpatient incentives introduction 
in 2007. 
Specific objectives: 
• Identify upcoding effects on fraction of 109 DRG pairs for each hospital in the 
sample, from 2003 to 2007; 
• Identify changes in length of stay, case-mix, age, nature of discharges 
(inpatient/outpatient), types of admission, discharge and transfer, following 
contract-program implementation in 2003 and introduction of new outpatient 
incentives in 2007, from 2002 to 2007; 
• Identify changes in coding following new medical outpatient incentives in 2007. 
Research Questions: 
• Are there significant upcoding effects on fraction of 109 DRG pairs explained 
by variations in DRG prices and age for each sampled hospital, between 2003 
and 2007? 
• Are there significant changes in yearly averages for length of stay, average age, 
case-mix, ratio of elective outpatient surgeries, types of admission, discharge 
and transfer, after contract-program implementation in 2003 and outpatient 
incentives in 2007? 
• Are there significant changes in the number of medical outpatient discharges 
after new outpatient incentives introduction in 2007? 
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3.3. Sample Description 
The sample in question includes all inpatients and outpatients discharged from five 
Portuguese acute public district hospitals, between 2002 and 2007. The sample is not 
statistically representative of countrywide inpatient and outpatient DRG outputs during 
the designated timeframe; generalization of inferences made is thus not possible for the 
population in question. District hospitals were selected given their major 
representativeness in terms of aggregated capacity, the highest among the five hospital 
divisions, as well as the highest rates of inpatients treated and inpatient days. Moreover, 
district hospitals are spread countrywide, providing a wide array of healthcare services 
with a relatively complex case-mix, close to the national average. 
In order to draw some means of comparison between data from hospitals in the sample 
and the district hospital’s group
17
, averages concerning three key performance 
indicators are shown in the table below: 
Table1. Comparison between the five  hospitals’ and district hospitals’ inpatient averages, in terms of length of stay, patients 
treated, inpatient days and case mix index, 2002-2007 period. 
 
Hospital 1 2 3 4 5 District Hospitals 
Average Length of Stay (Days) 5 5 5 6 5 7 
  (5,23) (5,01) (5,03) (5,26) (5,13) n.a. 
Average Inpatients Treated 14692 11169 20329 12907 20673 12634 
  (245) (399) (751) (171) (1270) (694) 
Average Inpatient Days 106588 78363 135598 101249 172994 86333 
  (3943) (4907) (4980) (3637) (11077) (4890) 
Case Mix Index (%) 0,85 0,90 0,97 0,90 0,91 n.a. 
 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parenthesis. 
From figures stated in table 1, it is possible to briefly characterize all hospitals as 
midsized at the national level. Nevertheless, hospitals 3 and 5 could be considered  as 
slightly more relevant hospitals, given both of them being above district hospitals’ 
averages, either in terms of patients treated per year and inpatient days, either by their 
case-mix index values, close to the national standard, especially in case of hospital 3 
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(0,97%). The remaining three hospitals might be considered as standard at the national 
level, given their lower average values in terms of patients treated, inpatient days and 
CMI
18
, when compared to the other two hospitals and to district hospitals’ averages. 
Taking into account several characterization variables, it is feasible to describe the 
sample in terms of nature of discharge (inpatient/outpatient) and type of DRG 
(medical/surgical) shares, as well as gender, age and types of admission, discharge and 
transfer. 
The sample in question comprises a total number of 537.247 discharges, 66,1% of them 
medical and 89,1% inpatient. Graph 1 characterizes the sample in terms of nature and 
type of discharges. 
Graph1:  Discharge variables percentage rates characterization for the total sample, period 2002-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Concerning gender, the sample comprises approximately 54% female and 46% male. 
Average ages for inpatients display means of 49 years and medians of 54 years for the 
2002-2007 timeframe, with rightward skewness in accordance with a proportional 
increase of healthcare needs verified with aging. As for outpatients, means and medians 
of 56 years seems to suggest that a majority of elective surgical discharges might 
explain the average age inflation in outpatients between 2002 and 2007, when compared 
to inpatients’ averages.  
Concerning type of admission, urgent admissions are the most common among 
inpatients, with averages close to 77% shares of urgent admissions. On average, 20% of 
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admissions are elective whereas the remainder is divided mostly by program related 
admissions destined to decrease surgical waiting times (PECLEC and SIGIC)
19
. As for 
outpatients, the large majority (84%) of admissions is elective, whilst the rest of 
admissions are allocated to SIGIC. 
Concerning SIGIC implementation, 2005 was a transitional year from PECLEC to 
SIGIC, thereafter PECLEC being fully replaced by SIGIC admissions. However, the 
rate of admissions has maintained similar levels to those verified in the previous 
program for inpatient admissions, whereas for outpatients more encouraging rates are 
observable, with a positive variation of 10% in averages between rates for both 
programs, with averages of 4,7% admission rates for PECLEC, against averages of 
14,8% for SIGIC, for the period 2002-2007. 
Concerning type of discharge, approximately 91% of inpatients and 87% of outpatients 
were discharged to their households. Discharges against medical opinion, an indicator 
with potential influence on budgeting
20
, is not considered to be relevant, given rates 
below 1% for both discharge types. 
Deceased rates, as a possible descriptive measure of healthcare quality, are quite stable 
throughout the analyzed timeframe, averaging 5% for inpatients. Concerning type of 
transfer, solely 2,5% inpatients and 0,3% were transferred. Consequently, transfer rates 
for the considered sample might be considered as being irrelevant. 
Graph2: MDG shares for inpatient and outpatients between 2002 and 2007, for all hospitals. 
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In terms of DRG output concentration description, 53% of inpatient’s DRG outputs 
between 2002 and 2007 are attributable to only 5 out of the 26 groups, meaning 
approximately 20% of the total output. A relatively high MDG concentration rate is thus 
verified for the sample in question, despite output stability in relative terms. Regarding 
outpatient MDG’s, output concentration is even greater, since only 18 MDGs comprised 
outpatient output, of which two MDG’s were accountable for 56% of total output 
(MDGs 17
21
 and 2
22
, with 31% and 25% shares respectively). 
 
3.4. Data Analysis 
In order to estimate upcoding effects for DRG pairs in the sample, estimation using 
grouped data procedures was selected, thus allowing for more conservative standard 
errors, further corrected for heteroskedasticity by clustered robust standard errors 
calculations.  
Pair selection took into account two requisites: the presence of complications in one of 
the pair’s DRG and each pair being included both in 2003 and 2007 DRG tables
23
. 
According to these assumptions, 112 pairs were included for estimation. However, three 
pairs were dropped due to lack of observations.  
A pair’s fraction
24
 variation across time and hospital serves as a proxy to identify 
possible upcoding trends in pairs (Dafny, 2005). 
The following linear regression equation was set up to test for effects on fraction: 
 
            (1) 
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 DRG tables included in ordinances nr.123/2003, 5
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Where fraction is the dependent variable, which is the share of admissions to a pair in a 
certain year and hospital belonging to the top code for that pair.  
Graph3. Differences in fraction for 109 DRG pairs, 2003-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
The aforementioned graph displays differences in percentages of the most expensive 
DRG for a given pair in two distinct years, 2003 and 2007, in which is not possible to 
distinguish a clear trend in terms of increases in fraction. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
observe a higher concentration of pairs below the 20% most expensive DRGs coded for 
both years, confirmed by 2003 and 2007 fraction medians (0,248 and 0,238, 
respectively). 
Spread, pair, year, hospital and average age are the independent variables of interest, 
being the dimensions of its coefficient vectors: ς (1 x 109), δ (1 x 5), µ (1 x 5), γ (1 x 1) 
and ψ (1 x 1). 
The variable spread addresses differences in DRG prices in top codes and DRG prices 
in bottom codes, for each pair, in a given hospital and year. The measure of interest is 
the difference of spreads for each pair between 2003 and 2007, for a given hospital, 
allowing its coefficient to capture any marginal effects of differential upcoding 
incentives (if ψ > 0, hospitals upcoded more in pairs where the incentive to do so 
increased more). 
The following graph displays differences in spread for each pair, between 2003 and 
2007. 
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Graph4. Differences in spread for 109 DRG pairs, 2003-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By looking at graph 4 a decreasing trend in spread is apparent, in which approximately 
83% of the pairs have presented decreases in prices, with a 95% confidence interval for 
average spread between -769€ and -412€, which might be interpreted as a dissuasive 
incentive to upcoding practices. 
The year coefficient captures the average impact of price changes on all pairs, whereas 
the hospital coefficient captures effects of price changes in each hospital. Age 
coefficient captures average age effects of price changes for each pair, for each given 
year and hospital. 
Graph5. Differences in average age for 109 DRG pairs, 2003-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5 allows observing that the majority of average ages does not vary considerably 
between 2003 and 2007; even so, average age has increased by approximately 64% of 
the sampled pairs. Medians for 2003 and 2007 are of 63 and 61 years old respectively. 
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Table3. Fraction, spread and average age variables’ means, by hospital and year. 
N=2700         Fraction           Spread       Average Age 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
Hospital 1 547 0,222 547 -0,326 547 58 
Hospital 2 535 0,305 535 -0,322 535 60 
Hospital 3 544 0,302 544 -0,328 544 59 
Hospital 4 533 0,295 533 -0,315 533 60 
Hospital 5 541 0,267 541 -0,325 541 58 
Total 2700 0,278 2700 -0,323 2700 59 
2003 539 0,279 539 -0,324 539 59 
2004 539 0,277 539 -0,330 539 59 
2005 539 0,274 539 -0,325 539 59 
2006 544 0,273 544 -0,324 544 60 
2007 539 0,286 539 -0,313 539 60 
Total 2700 0,278 2700 -0,323 2700 59 
 
Table 3 displays means for both dependent and independent variables. It is relevant to 
outline the negative spread means across all hospitals and years, evidence that measures 
undertaken to decrease price differentiation had been the most relevant for the pairs in 
study. 
In order to assure estimations’ validity, fixed effects were considered for DRG pairs, 
thus correcting for endogeneity and ruling out the possibility that changes in spread 
could be correlated to omitted variables affecting changes in fraction (Dafny, 2005). 
Descriptive and inferential statistical techniques in the form of two sample tests of 
hypothesis, assuming equal variances, were applied in order to test for differences in 
DRG coding between 2002 and 2003-2007 period, as well as between 2002-2006 period 
and 2007, aiming at testing any significant differences in means regarding 
characterization variables such as length of stay, case-mix, age, ratio of elective 
outpatient surgeries and types of admission, discharge and transfer, both for inpatients 
as for outpatients, for each hospital. Outliers were excluded for length of stay and case-
mix estimations
25
. 
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Tests of hypothesis were also applied to test if the introduction of new medical 
outpatient DRGs with ordinance 110-A/2007, 5
th
 February, induced changes in coding 
for the DRGs in question. Tests of hypothesis were run considering differences 
occurring between 2002-2006 period and 2007, for each hospital. 
   
4. Results and Discussion 
 
 
4.1. Are there significant upcoding effects on fraction of 109 DRG pairs explained by 
variations in DRG prices and age for each sampled hospital, between 2003 and 2007? 
Linear regression estimates for the 5 hospitals in the sample are presented in the 
following table. 
Table4. Effects of variations in spread, average age and years on upcoding of 109 DRG pairs. 
N=2700 Hospitals Std Errors 
∆ Spread 0,104 *** 0,020 
Average Age 0,005 *** 0,000 
2004 -0,006 0,014 
2005 -0,008 0,013 
2006 -0,014 0,014 
2007 -0,005 0,013 
Hospital 2 0,074 *** 0,012 
Hospital 3 0,068 *** 0,014 
Hospital 4 0,057 *** 0,014 
Hospital 5 0,043 * 0,016 
Overall R-squared 0,145 
 
Note: Robust standard errors; p-value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05*. Unit of observation is the DRG pair per 
year, per hospital. 
 
Estimates displayed allow inferring that fraction appears to be positively sensible to 
changes in spread, as well as to average age changes, being those coefficients 
statistically significant. Concerning hospital dummies, it appears that all hospitals seem 
to present significantly positive variations in fraction, compared to hospital 1. Time 
effects appear not to be statistically significant to explain upcoding trends for the DRG 
pairs contained in the sample. 
20 
 
Concerning spread effects on DRG pairs’ complexity, despite a positive effect in spread 
verified by an expected change of 0,104 in fraction for each 2342,38€
26
 increase in 
spread, when remaining variables are held fixed, negative average changes in spread 
occurring from 2003 to 2007 reduced attractiveness to upcode. The verified decrease in 
price differentiation reduced sampled DRG pairs’ average complexity, despite a positive 
reaction to upcode more in pairs where higher price increases had been verified. 
Average age coefficient is also significant: an expected change of 0,005 in fraction is 
expected for each 1 year increase in average age for sampled hospitals. Fact which is in 
line with verified increases in average age across the sampled timeframe. Due to 
increasing intensity of healthcare stock fulfillments arising with aging, related for 
instance to comorbidities, aging tends to naturally increase DRG pair complexity. 
In order to capture hospital level effects and to determine potential differences in 
responses to upcoding incentives, the same regression analysis was applied to each of 
the five hospitals. Estimates are presented in the following table: 
Table5.  Effects of variations in spread, average age and years on upcoding of 109 DRG pairs, by hospital. 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis; p-value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05*. Unit of 
observation is the DRG pair per year, per hospital. 
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 2342,38€ is the standard equivalent to a DRG weight of value equal to 1. 
Hospitals 1 2 3 4 5 
∆ Spread 0,012 0,119 ** 0,070 * 0,147 *** 0,057 
(0,044) (0,041) (0,027) (0,029) (0,036) 
Average Age 0,005 *** 0,006 *** 0,005 *** 0,005 *** 0,005 *** 
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) 
2004 0,004 -0,026 -0,013 0,047 -0,036 
(0,045) (0,041) (0,035) (0,029) (0,028) 
2005 0,017 -0,032 0,027 -0,005 -0,028 
(0,036) (0,034) (0,027) (0,031) (0,034) 
2006 0,013 -0,070 0,025 -0,002 -0,029 
(0,030) (0,042) (0,035) (0,033) (0,032) 
2007 0,033 -0,043 -0,019 0,015 0,014 
(0,033) (0,037) (0,028) (0,033) (0,034) 
Overall R-
squared 0,085 0,148 0,157 0,137 0,129 
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Table 2 allows inferring positive and significant effects of variations in spread, from 
2003 to 2007, for hospitals 2, 3 and 4, as well as significant average age effects across 
all hospitals in general, while time effects do not present any statistical significance for 
the sampled hospitals. 
Variable fraction is sensitive to changes in spread for hospitals 2, 3 and 4, meaning 
those hospitals apparently tended to upcoded more in pairs with higher positive changes 
in spread. 
Hence, for hospital 2 the expected change in fraction is of 0,119 per each 2342,38€ 
increase in DRG prices, whilst for hospitals 3 and 4 there are changes of 0,07 and 0,147 
per each 2342,38€ increase in DRG prices, when remaining variables are held fixed. 
Concerning average age coefficients, it is evident a statistically significant effect of 
average age on fraction across all hospitals. An increase of 0,005 in upcoding for each 
additional 1 year is verified for hospitals, exception made for hospital 2 which presents 
a 0,006 increase, when remaining variables are held fixed. 
Given results obtained, it is possible to infer positive variations in fraction with changes 
in prices and average age, thus confirming upcoding practices in 3 out of the 5 hospitals. 
Aging also plays a significant part on the increase in fraction of most complicated 
diagnosis for the sampled DRG pairs. Price changes, despite inducing positive effects 
on fraction, do not induce higher expenditure since their variations are negative on 
average for this sample, a fact which cancels the incentive to engage in upcoding 
practices. However, awareness seems to exist concerning rewards for upcoding, since 
three hospitals seem to present tendency to upcode more in pairs where differences in 
prices between non complicated and complicated diagnosis are larger.  
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4.2. Are there significant changes in yearly averages for length of stay, average age, 
case-mix, ratio of elective outpatient surgeries, types of admission, discharge and 
transfer, after contract-program implementation in 2003 and outpatient incentives in 
2007? 
Test of hypothesis’ outcomes, concerning average age for both contract-program and 
outpatient incentives’ introduction, are displayed in the following table. 
Table6. Two sample t-test estimates for average age between 2002 and 2003-2007 period; between 2002-2006 period and 
2007, by nature of discharge27, per hospital.  
 
  ∆ 2002 ∆ 2007 
Hospital Discharge N T-test P-value N T-test P-value 
1 Inpatients 88153 0,568 0,285 88153 -1,436 0,076 
Outpatients 14467 -11,439 0,000 *** 14467 14,975 0,000 *** 
2 Inpatients 67015 -0,043 0,483 67015 -0,050 0,480 
Outpatients 10230 -17,675 0,000 *** 10230 24,853 0,000 *** 
3 Inpatients 121974 -6,454 0,000 *** 121974 8,041 0,000 *** 
Outpatients 15018 -13,969 0,000 *** 15018 44,974 0,000 *** 
4 Inpatients 77442 -8,093 0,000 *** 77442 7,750 0,000 *** 
Outpatients 4470 -6,971 0,000 *** 4470 15,036 0,000 *** 
5 Inpatients 124035 -10,387 0,000 *** 124035 8,972 0,000 *** 
Outpatients 14443 -6,456 0,000 *** 14443 20,719 0,000 
 
Note: ∆2002 equals the difference between year 2002 and 2003-2007 period; ∆2007 equals the difference between year 2007 
and 2002-2006 period; t-test (α=0,05); -value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05. 
 
Negative significant differences are visible for both inpatients and outpatients after 
2002, followed by predominant positive significant differences for 2007, thus 
confirming that average age had in fact increased during this period, as expected, with 
potential positive impact on both lengths of stay and resource intensity outcomes. 
Similar results were found for both medical and surgical DRGs. 
Concerning average length of stay, estimates are presented in the table below. 
 
 
 
                                                           
27
 Inpatient or outpatient discharges. 
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Table7. Two sample t-test estimates for average length of stay between 2002 and 2003-2007 period; between 2002-2006 
period and 2007, by nature of discharge, per hospital.  
 
Note: ∆2002 equals the difference between year 2002 and 2003-2007 period; ∆2007 equals the difference between year 2007 
and 2002-2006 period; t-test (α=0,05); -value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05*. 
 
Considering the nature of discharges it is possible to infer, for the period after contract-
program implementation, that there are positive significant differences in average length 
of stay for inpatients in 3 out of 5 hospitals, whereas for outpatients negative significant 
differences are found also for 3 out of 5 hospitals. These outcomes signify a decrease in 
average length of stay for inpatients, possibly indicative of more efficiency in DRG 
output, hence a possible positive response to contract-program implementation. On the 
other hand, for outpatients this increase might indicate an opposite effect, in which less 
discharge efficiency within the 24 hours’ timeframe might grant marginal losses for 
each extra inpatient day paid as outpatient diagnosis. For the time period after outpatient 
incentives’ implementation there are also significant and negative changes in averages 
for 4 out of 5 hospitals for inpatients, and in 3 out of 5 hospitals for outpatients, which 
might also reflect an increase in healthcare provision efficiency after introduction of 
new incentives for outpatient output enhancement.  
In terms of type of DRG, for both implementation periods it is observable a significant 
decrease in average length of stay, common to medical and surgical DRGs across all 
  ∆ 2002 ∆ 2007 
Hospital Discharge N T-test P-value N T-test P-value 
1 Inpatients 84325 2,729 0,003 ** 84325 -1,383 0,083 
Outpatients 13328 -5,042 0,000 *** 14467 -8,137 0,000 *** 
2 Inpatients 64627 -0,653 0,257 64627 -5,200 0,000 *** 
Outpatients 10230 -2,734 0,003 ** 10230 -1,245 0,107 
3 Inpatients 118138 3,386 0,000 *** 118138 -1,857 0,032 * 
Outpatients 15018 -3,575 0,000 *** 15018 -7,573 0,000 *** 
4 Inpatients 74170 -0,787 0,216 74170 -2,357 0,009 ** 
Outpatients 4470 -0,912 0,181 4470 -0,609 0,271 
5 Inpatients 118807 8,867 0,000 *** 118807 -7,101 0,000 *** 
Outpatients 14443 16,443 0,000 *** 14443 -10,687 0,000 *** 
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hospitals in general. Positive results are found in terms of decreasing length of stay, 
despite the confirmed increase on average age verified for this timeframe. 
Estimates for both inpatients’ and outpatients’ case-mix are presented in the following 
table. 
Table8. Two sample t-test estimates for case-mix between 2002 and 2003-2007 period; between 2002-2006 period and 2007, 
by nature of discharge, per hospital. 
  
∆ 2002 ∆ 2007 
Hospital Discharge N T-test P-value N T-test P-value 
1 Inpatients 84618 3,283 0,001 *** 84618 -4,438 0,000 *** 
1 Outpatients 14467 11,770 0,000 *** 14467 -71,392 0,000 *** 
2 Inpatients 64179 -3,159 0,001 *** 64179 1,804 0,036 * 
2 Outpatients 10230 6,077 0,000 *** 10230 -62,394 0,000 *** 
3 Inpatients 115405 -3,839 0,000 *** 115405 0,919 0,179 
3 Outpatients 15018 9,744 0,000 *** 15018 -67,778 0,000 *** 
4 Inpatients 74714 -7,759 0,000 *** 74714 5,619 0,000 *** 
4 Outpatients 4470 -0,687 0,246 4470 -33,830 0,000 *** 
5 Inpatients 117742 -3,771 0,000 *** 117742 4,814 0,000 *** 
5 Outpatients 14443 1,514 0,065 14443 -52,068 0,000 *** 
 
Note: ∆2002 equals the difference between year 2002 and 2003-2007 period; ∆2007 equals the difference between year 2007 
and 2002-2006 period; t-test (α=0,05); -value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05*. 
 
Significant outcomes for inpatients and outpatients case-mix allow to infer, in general, 
an increase in inpatient case-mix complexity throughout the whole timeframe, verified 
through negative changes after 2002 and positive changes in 2007. Opposite outcomes 
are observable for outpatients’ case-mix, which had suffered a decrease in complexity 
of throughout the sampled timeframe, for all hospitals in general. This behavior might 
confirm a positive relationship between average age and increasing case-mix 
complexity despite verified decreases in length of stay for inpatients, whilst for 
outpatients this change might be related with the high concentration of DRG outputs, 
namely after 2006. 
Another relevant indicator of greater DRG output efficiency, under the contract-
program scheme, regards the ratio of elective outpatient surgeries per year, over the 
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total number of elective surgeries. The following table displays estimates for each 
hospital’s ratio differences, for both periods. 
Table9. Two sample t-test estimates for ratio of elective outpatient surgeries between 2002 and 2003-2007 period; between 
2002-2006 period and 2007, by nature of discharge, per hospital. 
 
Hospital ∆ 2002 Δ 2007 
% 
Ratio 
N t-test  p-value N t-test p-value 
1 17378 -14,023 0,000 *** 17378 20,958 0,000 *** 0,39 
2 14435 -21,684 0,000 *** 14435 3,410 0,000 *** 0,37 
3 29986 -21,759 0,000 *** 29986 32,778 0,000 *** 0,21 
4 11555 -17,006 0,000 *** 11555 15,429 0,000 *** 0,27 
5 26933 19,529 0,000 *** 26933 -22,146 0,000 *** 0,30 
Note: ∆2002 equals the difference between year 2002 and 2003-2007 period; ∆2007 equals the difference between year 2007 
and 2002-2006 period; t-test (α=0,05); -value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05*. 
 
In 4 out of 5 hospitals significant differences are verified for both periods, 
demonstrating an apparently strong increase in ratio of elective outpatient surgeries, in 
line with efficiency incentives provided by contract-program introduction and outpatient 
incentives provided. Exception made for hospital 5, which seems to present an opposite 
behavior in comparison to the remaining sample. 
Regarding type of admission, the following graphs allow to compare differences prior 
and after contract-program and outpatient incentives introduction, both for inpatients 
and outpatients, for all hospitals. 
Graphs6&7: Inpatient and outpatient differences in type of admissions, prior and post contract-program implementation 
(2003) and outpatient incentives (2007), for all hospitals. 
 
 
 
Despite graphs 6 and 7 apparently showing little changes in type of admission, two 
sample t-tests assuming equal variances outcomes
28
 performed show significant changes 
                                                           
28
 Annex 1. 
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for all hospitals, for both periods. Exception made for hospital 4, in which t-test results 
are not as clear about changes after contract-program introduction, though overall
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results are significant. However, in global terms, it is clear the predominance of urgent 
admissions over elective for inpatients and of elective over urgent admissions for 
outpatients for the period in analysis. A reference concerning SIGIC admissions for 
outpatients should be made, since it varies considerably across hospitals, ranging from 
zero SIGIC admissions in hospital 4 to 31% average SIGIC admissions since 2005 in 
hospital 1, thus putting on evidence the heterogeneity of admission rates related to 
patients incorporated in this system, across the hospitals in the sample. 
Graphs8&9: Inpatient and outpatient differences in type of discharge, prior and post contract-program implementation 
(2003) and outpatient incentives (2007), for all hospitals. 
 
 
In terms of type of discharge, t-test outcomes
30
 allow to infer significant changes for the 
total sample for both periods, except for hospital 4, concerning t-test outcomes for 
overall changes after 2002.  
Regarding type of transfer t-test outcomes
31
, significant overall changes are also verified 
for the total sample, however, only for hospitals 1, 3 and 4 significant changes are 
verified for both periods, not being verified significant changes for the remainder in any 
period. 
                                                           
29
 “Overall” - Differences in means without considering type of discharge or type of transfer. 
30
 Annex 2. 
31
 Annex 3. 
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Major diagnosis groups’ (MDG) analysis allows for a descriptive outlook on both 
inpatient and outpatient outputs for the sample, as well as for differences prior and post 
contract program implementation and outpatient incentives: 
 
Graphs10&11: Inpatient and outpatient differences in MDG’ relative frequencies, prior and post contract-program 
implementation (2003) and outpatient incentives (2007), for all hospitals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considerable differences seem only to be evident for outpatient discharges, in which a 
considerable reduction is observable for MDG 2 relative output (-23%), after 
outpatients’ incentives introduction, whereas a big increase was verified for MDG 17 
(+53,4%). These responses in outpatient output are mainly due to a large increase in 
coding of DRG 410 (chemotherapy), to which a new outpatient price had been 
attributed in 2007. Despite a relative reduction, MDG 2 (lens surgery), has also 
benefited from a considerable increase in output in absolute terms, starting in 2006, 
which might be interpreted as an outcome of health system’s efforts to rapidly increase 
output on this specific DRG, due perhaps to political reasons. 
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4.3. Are there significant changes in the number of medical outpatient discharges 
after new outpatient incentives introduction in 2007? 
In order to identify changes in coding following new medical outpatient incentives 
implemented in 2007, two sample t-tests assuming equal variances were performed to 
25 medical DRG’s to which had been added new outpatient incentives in 2007.  
The following table presents estimates for the 14 DRGs presenting significant 
differences in average outpatient discharges, prior and after price introduction, and also 
its corresponding fractions of outpatients in 2007: 
Table10. Two sample t-test estimates for statistically significant differences in average outpatient discharges, concerning 
medical DRGs with new outpatient prices, prior and after 2007.   
GDH t-test p-value Fraction% 
35 -5,383 0,000 *** 74,65 
82 -3,430 0,000 *** 0,00 
100 2,968 0,002 ** 19,44 
125 3,619 0,000 *** 3,23 
183 -2,936 0,002 ** 0,00 
323 3,082 0,001 ** 44,31 
338 -2,180 0,015 * 0,00 
351 2,835 0,002 ** 83,33 
409 4,740 0,000 *** 97,18 
410 13,728 0,000 *** 99,29 
465 2,427 0,008 ** 67,35 
466 -5,003 0,000 *** 5,21 
467 -9,760 0,000 *** 0,34 
777 -4,250 0,000 *** 0,00 
 
Note: t-test (α=0,05); p-value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05*; fraction percentages in 2007. 
 
It appears that approximately 56% of medical DRGs with new outpatient incentives 
have presented significant changes in inpatient averages, and from these 14 medical 
DRG’s, 7 had experienced a decrease in inpatient discharges. However, merely 5 DRGs 
(20%) presented fractions of outpatient discharges above 50%. On the other hand, 4 
DRGs with significant differences in inpatient averages have not presented any 
outpatient discharges in 2007 for the sample in question. A mention should still be made 
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to DRG 410, which solely was responsible for a boost in outpatient output in 2007, in 
absolute values, being responsible for an increase of approximately 17.000 outpatient 
discharges, accounting for nearly 30% of total outpatient discharges for the total sample. 
Nevertheless, it is not yet possible to observe a clear trend on medical outpatients’ 
incentives’ effectiveness for this sample, in terms of the set of DRGs considered, since 
several kinds of responses to incentives have been verified. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Contract-program implementation has been considered an important step forward in 
what respects to efficiency, accountability, and in the future, health gains.  
However, the Portuguese National Health Service needs to be capable of monitoring 
and evaluating the effectiveness of measures undertaken within its output 
centers/providers, in order to proceed with the necessary adjustments to measures 
implemented and thus justify the investment made on its implementation. 
The present work project aimed at somewhat unveiling possible effects occurred after 
contract-program implementation in 2003 and subsequent outpatient incentives 
introduced in 2007. 
Short note for the limitations of work project, related to the non-representativeness of 
the sample, which does not allow generalizing results obtained, as well relating to the 
undisclosed identity of the hospitals in the sample, at least concerning its status as EPE 
or SPA, in order to allow for further comparisons.  
As for the first research question, which addresses upcoding detection in 109 DRG 
pairs, results obtained should raise awareness for the possibility of upcoding practices 
being engaged in Portugal, and also to its negative impact on expenditure in a future 
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scenario of positive average changes in prices within DRG pairs, taking into account the 
relevant negative impact caused by DRG creep overseas. 
Regarding the research question on changes in several quality and performance 
indicators, prior and after contract-program and incentives’ introduction, significant 
positive effects were found in general. Significant decreases on average lengths of stay 
were found, despite average increases on average age and case-mix, which might be 
interpreted as an outcome of efficiency and productivity measures induced by contract-
program clauses. Significant positive outcomes were also achieved for the ratio of 
outpatient elective surgeries, as a possible sign of effectiveness on outpatient incentives 
implemented with contract-program’s inception. Mention also to variations on SIGIC 
adherence shares for outpatients across the 5 hospitals, ranging from 0 to 31%, thus 
reflecting some heterogeneity in its adoption, at least at outpatient level.  
In terms of MDG concentration, relevant outcomes were obtained, namely related to 
high concentration of discharges for outpatients, in which a high increase in the share of 
discharges was observable for DRG 410 (chemotherapy), in 2007. These results thus 
apparently show the potential reach of outpatient incentives in inducing increases in 
volume within a relatively short timeframe. 
Concerning outcomes of new outpatient prices created for 25 medical DRGs in 2007, a 
clear significant trend is not yet clearly defined for the set of DRGs in question, mainly 
in terms of generic increases on fraction of outpatient discharges for the majority of 
DRGs. However, discharges due to DRG 410 have accounted for a considerable 
increase in the number of outpatient discharges in 2007, enforcing evidence in favor of 
the actual effectiveness of outpatient incentives created in 2007, at least for the sample 
in question. 
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Further studies should deepen the impact of contract-program implementation and 
incentives in a representative sample, able to generalize results at the national level, as 
well as to increase knowledge about upcoding practices in Portugal. 
Hence, it is possible to affirm that in generic terms the impact of contract-programs on 
hospitals’ DRG output seems to be positive for the considered sample. Decreasing 
lengths of stay were verified despite increases in average age and case-mix. Attention 
should be paid though to upcoding, as well as to high concentration levels of DRG 
output, which might indicate needs for further adjustments, namely concerning the 
reinforcement of an apparently successful outpatient incentives plan implementation.  
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7. ANNEXES 
 
 
Annex1. Two sample t-test estimates average type of admission, between 2002 and 2003-2007 period; between 2002-2006 
period and 2007, by nature of discharge, per hospital. 
 
Hospital 
  
∆ 2002 ∆ 2007 
  
N T-test P-value N T-test P-value 
1 Overall 102620 -25,117 0,000 102620 -0,346 0,365 
 
Inpatient 88153 -23,777 0,000 88153 5,024 0,000 
 
Outpatient 14467 -14,441 0,000 14467 -10,006 0,000 
2 Overall 77245 -8,418 0,000 77245 14,487 0,000 
 
Inpatient 67015 -14,164 0,000 67015 17,964 0,000 
 
Outpatient 10230 -6,939 0,000 10230 15,274 0,000 
3 Overall 136992 -4,106 0,000 136992 -14,445 0,000 
 
Inpatient 121974 -16,357 0,000 121974 23,466 0,000 
 
Outpatient 15018 -3,000 0,001 15018 5,861 0,000 
4 Overall 81912 10,116 0,000 81912 -33,643 0,000 
 
Inpatient 77442 -0,638 0,262 77442 -9,159 0,000 
 
Outpatient 4470 0,955 0,170 4470 -7,026 0,000 
5 Overall 138478 -21,930 0,000 138478 8,721 0,000 
 
Inpatient 124035 -25,956 0,000 124035 22,288 0,000 
 
Outpatient 14443 -8,948 0,000 14443 -2,983 0,001 
 
Note: ∆2002 equals the difference between year 2002 and 2003-2007 period; ∆2007 equals the difference between year 2007 
and 2002-2006 period; t-test (α=0,05); -value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05*. 
 
 
Annex2. Two sample t-test estimates average type of discharge, between 2002 and 2003-2007 period; between 2002-2006 
period and 2007, by nature of discharge, per hospital. 
 
Hospital ∆ 2002 ∆ 2007 
N T-test P-value N T-test P-value 
1 Overall 102620 -3,586 0,000 102620 17,057 0,000 
Inpatient 88153 -3,031 0,001 88153 12,134 0,000 
Outpatient 14467 -6,541 0,000 14467 24,586 0,000 
2 Overall 77245 3,517 0,000 77245 -9,376 0,000 
Inpatient 67015 0,057 0,477 67015 -1,524 0,064 
Outpatient 10230 -0,779 0,218 10230 0,457 0,324 
3 Overall 136992 8,147 0,000 136992 -15,292 0,000 
Inpatient 121974 4,086 0,000 121974 -3,487 0,000 
Outpatient 15018 2,064 0,020 15018 -0,638 0,262 
4 Overall 81912 0,413 0,340 81912 -2,732 0,000 
Inpatient 77442 -1,006 0,157 77442 0,576 0,282 
Outpatient 4470 -0,224 0,411 4470 0,048 0,481 
5 Overall 138478 1,662 0,048 138478 -14,027 0,000 
Inpatient 124035 1,728 0,042 124035 -1,114 0,133 
Outpatient 14443 18,755 0,000 14443 -89,720 0,000 
 
Note: ∆2002 equals the difference between year 2002 and 2003-2007 period; ∆2007 equals the difference between year 2007 
and 2002-2006 period; t-test (α=0,05); -value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05. 
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Annex3. Two sample t-test estimates average type of transfer, between 2002 and 2003-2007 period; between 2002-2006 
period and 2007, by nature of discharge, per hospital. 
 
 
Hospital ∆ 2002 ∆ 2007 
N T-test P-value N T-test P-value 
1 Overall 102620 -4,068 0,000 102620 2,419 0,008 
Inpatient 88153 -5,604 0,000 88153 9,492 0,000 
Outpatient 14467 -2,450 0,007 14467 -6,444 0,000 
2 Overall 77245 -0,371 0,355 77245 0,992 0,161 
Inpatient 67015 -1,768 0,039 67015 4,731 0,000 
Outpatient 10230 -1,016 0,155 10230 1,769 0,039 
3 Overall 136992 21,709 0,000 136992 -15,115 0,000 
Inpatient 121974 18,627 0,000 121974 -8,765 0,000 
Outpatient 15018 1,498 0,067 15018 -1,712 0,044 
4 Overall 81912 5,614 0,000 81912 -1,758 0,039 
Inpatient 77442 4,704 0,000 77442 0,097 0,461 
Outpatient 4470 -0,147 0,441 4470 0,955 0,170 
5 Overall 138478 0,275 0,392 138478 -1,635 0,051 
Inpatient 124035 -1,151 0,125 124035 1,863 0,031 
Outpatient 14443 -0,323 0,373 14443 -1,637 0,051 
 
Note: ∆2002 equals the difference between year 2002 and 2003-2007 period; ∆2007 equals the difference between year 2007 
and 2002-2006 period; t-test (α=0,05); -value<0,001***, p-value<0,01**, p-value<0,05*. 
 
